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Abstract We explore a distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ readings in counter-
factual donkey sentences and observe three open issues in the current literature on
these sentences: (i) van Rooij (2006) and Wang (2009) make different empirical
predictions with respect to the availability of ‘high’ donkey readings. We settle this
question in favour of van Rooij’s (2006) analysis. (ii) This analysis overgenerates
with respect to weak readings in so-called ‘identificational’ donkey sentences. We
argue that pronouns in these sentences should not be analysed as donkey pronouns,
but as concealed questions or as part of a cleft. (iii) The analysis also undergenerates
with respect to NPI licensing in counterfactual antecedents. We propose a strict
conditional semantics for counterfactual donkey sentences that derives the correct
licensing facts.
Keywords: donkey sentences, counterfactuals, dynamic semantics, modal horizon, negative
polarity items, strict conditional analysis, concealed question, cleft-construction
1 Introduction
Counterfactual donkey sentences are sentences like (3) that have both the ingredients
of a classical conditional donkey sentence, i.e., interclausal binding as in (1) (Geach
1962), and the morphology of plain counterfactual sentences, underlined in (2).
(1) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
(2) If Pedro owned Platero, he would beat it(/him).
(3) If a farmer owned a donkey, he would beat it.
Such sentences raise the question of how to combine a proper semantics for
the counterfactual with an adequate semantics for donkey quantification. We first
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introduce these two ingredients separately. The issue is how the restriction to
maximally similar worlds used in the interpretation of counterfactuals should be
intertwined with the apparatus needed for donkey quantification.
1.1 Counterfactuals: Variably strict analysis
In the classical variably strict approach developed by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis
(1973), the truth conditions of a plain counterfactual conditional like (2) are rela-
tivized to an accessibility function f , mapping each world w in its domain to the set
of worlds which make the antecedent clause φ true and are otherwise maximally
similar to w according to a given ordering relation ≤, as defined in (4).1 A counter-
factual sentence φ > ψ then asserts that all φ -worlds that are maximally similar to
the actual world are also ψ-worlds; see (5).
(4) fw(JφK f ,≤) = {v ∈ JφK f ,≤ | ¬∃u ∈ JφK f ,≤ : u <w v}
(5) Jφ > ψK f ,≤(w) = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ fw(JφK f ,≤) : w′ ∈ JψK f ,≤
1.2 Donkey sentences: Dynamic predicate logic
We limit our discussion of indicative donkey sentences to a standard dynamic seman-
tics for quantification and pronouns: Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL, Groenendijk
& Stokhof 1991)2. The main problem of donkey sentences as perceived from this
perspective is the mismatch between the compositionally derived formula in (6) and
the reading that donkey sentences are usually taken to have in (7):
(6) ∃xPx→ Qx
(7) ∀x[Px→ Qx]
The solution advocated by Groenendijk & Stokhof is a logic that derives the
equivalence of those two formulas. That is, in their system there is no difference in
the interpretation of (6) and (7):
(8) ∃xPx→ Qx ⇔ ∀x[Px→ Qx]
The way that DPL derives this equivalence is by moving from a static semantics
where the semantic value of an expression is a set of assignments to a dynamic
semantics where the semantic value of an expression is a set of pairs of assignments,
one ‘input’ pair and one ‘output’ pair. That is, we explicitely record and pass on
changes to the assignment functions in moving from static (9) to (10).
1 For simplicity, we make the limit assumption (Lewis 1973).
2 Dynamic approaches to donkey sentences have been challenged by modern D-type theories that make
use of situation semantics (Heim 1990, Büring 2004, Elbourne 2005). We leave this debate between
static and dynamic approaches aside for the purposes of this paper.
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(9) J∃xPxK= {g | ∃h : h[x]g ∧ h(x) ∈ F(P)}
(10) J∃xPxK= {〈g,h〉 | h[x]g ∧ h(x) ∈ F(P)}
Given such a setup, we can now specify which formulas should make perma-
nent or temporary changes in assignments. Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991) define
existential quantification and the conditional as follows:
(11) J∃xφK= {〈g,h〉 | ∃k : k[x]g ∧ 〈k,h〉 ∈ JφK}
(12) Jφ → ψK= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : 〈h,k〉 ∈ JφK→∃ j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JψK}
Putting these together, we can derive the following result for the left side of (8):
(13) J∃xPx→ QxK
= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : 〈h,k〉 ∈ J∃xPxK→∃ j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JQxK}
= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : (k[x]h ∧ k(x) ∈ F(P))→∃ j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JQxK}
= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : (k[x]h ∧ k(x) ∈ F(P))→ k(x) ∈ F(Q)}
A quick comparison with the result for deriving the right side using the lexical
entry for universal quantification in (14) shows that this is indeed equivalent:
(14) J∀xψK= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : k[x]h→∃ j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JψK}
(15) J∀x[Px→ Qx]K
= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : k[x]h→∃ j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JPx→ QxK}
= {〈g,h〉 | h= g ∧ ∀k : k[x]h→ (∀u : 〈k,u〉 ∈ JPxK→∃m : 〈u,m〉 ∈ JQxK)}
= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : k[x]h→ (k(x) ∈ F(P)→ k(x) ∈ F(Q)}
= {〈g,h〉 | h = g ∧ ∀k : (k[x]h ∧ k(x) ∈ F(P))→ k(x) ∈ F(Q)}
Later developments notwithstanding, this proposal provides a solid foundation
for the investigation of donkey sentences and other quantificational phenomena.
1.3 Goal and roadmap
The existing analyses of counterfactual donkey sentences in the literature (van Rooij
2006, Wang 2009) have combined a variably strict semantics for counterfactual
conditionals with a standard dynamic semantics like DPL. In this paper, we reveal
three shortcomings of the current state-of-the-art:
i) We vindicate van Rooij’s (2006) account with respect to Wang’s (2009) criticism
by showing that Wang (2009) cannot generate all the attested readings of the
indefinite NP in counterfactual sentences,




iii) We observe that van Rooij (2006) undergenerates with respect to the licensing
of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs).
To circumvent these problems, we will develop a strict conditional analysis (for
problem (iii)) that, following van Rooij (2006), builds assignment-sensitivity into
the order ≤ (for problem (i)) and that treats the relevant pronoun in identificational
sentences not as a donkey pronoun (for problem (ii)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents van Rooij’s (2006) and
Wang’s (2009) analyses of counterfactual donkey sentences. Section 3 lays out
our criticism: we need the additional readings of the indefinite NP powered by van
Rooij’s system and excluded by Wang’s (3.1), van Rooij’s system overgenerates weak
readings in identificational sentences (3.2), and van Rooij’s apparatus underlicences
NPIs (3.3). Our proposal is developed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous approaches
2.1 Van Rooij (2006)
Starting from the equivalence in (8), van Rooij (2006) argues that the aim of an
analysis for counterfactual donkey sentences should be to derive the same equiv-
alence for the counterfactual conditional, i.e., to obtain (16). The intuition is that,
assuming the domain of quantification {d1,d2,d3}, there is a reading of sentence
(17) that entails the conjunction of (18a-c). We will label indefinite NPs for which
this equivalence is valid as ‘high indefinites’ and we will call the corresponding
reading of the sentence ‘high reading’.
(16) ∃xPx > Qx ⇔ ∀x[Px > Qx]
(17) If John owned a donkey{d1,d2,d3}, he would beat it.
(18) a. If John owned d1, he would beat d1.
b. If John owned d2, he would beat d2.
c. If John owned d3, he would beat d3.
As a first step, van Rooij adapts the Stalnaker-Lewis variably strict semantics of
counterfactuals from Section 1.1 to a DPL framework. Since we are now dealing
not only with worlds, but with pairs 〈v,h〉 of a world and an assignment function,
the ordering relation ≤ that the accessibility function f is based on needs to be
modified accordingly. In order to derive the equivalence in (16), van Rooij chooses
a particular way of doing this: In his modified version of the ordering relation ≤∗,
only world-assignment pairs that share an assignment are ranked with respect to




(19) Modified order ≤∗ (to be revised):
〈v,h〉 ≤∗〈w,g〉 〈u,k〉 iffdef h = k ⊇ g ∧ v≤w u
It is easy to see that this reduces to the original Lewisian accessibility function in
contexts without donkey quantification: If the original assignment is not modified,
all pairs can be ranked with respect to each other on the basis of their worlds’ simi-
larity. The more interesting effect obtains in contexts with existential quantification:
Introducing a new variable into the assignment function means splitting the order-
ing into smaller sub-orderings, each sub-ordering anchored to a different variable
assignment. That is, for each individual that can be assigned as a value to the new
variable in the assignment, we end up with one sub-ordering of world-assignment
pairs.
Based on ≤∗, a new accessibility function f ∗ is defined in (20) mapping each
world-assignment pair 〈w,g〉 to the set of world-assignment pairs that satisfy φ and
that are otherwise maximally similar to 〈w,g〉. The truth conditions are then set up in
a way parallel to the classical Stalnaker-Lewis analysis, except that now we quantify
over pairs 〈v,h〉 rather that over worlds w′. Crucially, since the counterfactual
quantifies over the bottom elements 〈v,h〉 of all the smaller sub-orderings, it will
be quantifying over at least one world-assignment pair per individual. But then
existential quantification in the antecedent of a counterfactual is the same as universal
quantification over the entire counterfactual. This means that the desired equivalence
in (16) obtains.
(20) f ∗〈w,g〉(/φ/g) =def {〈v,h〉 ∈ /φ/g| ¬∃〈u,k〉 ∈ /φ/g : 〈u,k〉<∗〈w,g〉 〈v,h〉}
(21) Jφ > ψK f ∗,≤∗(〈w,g〉) = 1 iff ∀〈v,h〉 ∈ f ∗〈w,g〉(/φ/g) : 〈v,h〉 ∈ /ψ/g
To see this with a concrete example, consider the simple example (22) and the
model in Table 1:
(22) If John owned a donkey, he would beat it.
The selection function in (20) yields the following world-assignment pairs:
(23) f ∗〈w,g〉(/John owned a donkey/g) = {〈w1,gx/d1〉,〈w2,gx/d2〉,〈w3,gx/d3〉}
That is, although w1 is the closest world to the actual world, w2 and w3 also ap-
pear in the selection because their pairs do not share an assignment with 〈w1,gx/d1〉.
Note that, while other worlds also make the antecedent true for a given assignment
(i.e., w4 for gx/d1 and gx/d2), those do not appear because other antecedent worlds
are closer and paired with the same assignment.
Since each of the pairs in (23) also makes the consequent true, the counterfactual




w0 {d1,d2,d3} /0 /0
w1 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d1〉} {〈 j,d1〉}
w2 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d2〉} {〈 j,d2〉}
w3 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d3〉} {〈 j,d3〉}
w4 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d1〉,〈 j,d2〉} /0
Table 1 A sample model for (22), with worlds ranked as follows: w0 < w1 <
w2 = w3 < w4
for each individual d, we quantify at least over one 〈v,gx/d〉 pair. This derives the
equivalence in (16).
After this first step in adapting the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics to the DPL frame-
work, van Rooij (2006) notes that there is a second reading of indefinite NPs in
counterfactual donkey sentences for which the equivalence in (16) does not hold.
In identificational counterfactual donkey sentences like (24), it is not asserted that
each individual that is an animal and escaped last night in some world is Alex (the
Lion) in that world. That is, under the intended reading, (24) does not entail the
conjunction of (25a-c). Rather, the sentence expresses that in the closest world in
which some animal or other escaped, that animal is Alex.
(24) If an{a(lex),b,c} animal had escaped last night, it would have been Alex.
(25) a. If a had escaped last night, a would have been Alex.
b. If b had escaped last night, b would have been Alex.
c. If c had escaped last night, c would have been Alex.
While van Rooij (2006) treats this as a property of identificational sentences,
we note that this reading obtains in other contexts as well. For example, scenario
(26a) makes salient a reading of sentence (26b) for which the equivalence (16) does
not hold and according to which, in the most likely worlds where John owns some
donkey, John happens to own one of Melissa’s descendants and thus John beats that
donkey. Note that, while the sentence is true in scenario (26a) under this reading, the
high reading discussed above would make it false. We will call this second reading
‘low reading’ and we will label indefinite NPs giving rise to it as ‘low indefinites’.
(26) a. Scenario: Given how poor John’s family is, the only realistic chance he
ever had to own a donkey was for his grandpa’s donkey Melissa to have
descendants. Alas, Melissa never has descendants! But, if she had had
them, they would have been as stubborn as Melissa herself, so that their
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owner would have had to beat them. Excepting stubborn donkeys, John
has no inclination to beat donkeys.
b. If John owned a donkey, he would beat it (because he would own a stubborn
descendant of Melissa and he could not help but beat it).
In addition to the low readings of indefinite NPs just discussed for counterfactual
donkey sentences, we also encounter a reading familiar from the discussion of
indicative donkey sentences: The weak reading of the donkey-pronouns in (27)
(Schubert & Pelletier 1987) generalizes to the counterfactual case in (28).
(27) a. If I have a dime, I throw it into the meter.
b. Weak reading:
‘If I have one or more dimes, I throw one of the dimes into the meter.’
(28) If I had a dime, I would throw it into the meter.
In a second step adapting the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics to DPL, van Rooij
(2006) tackles both the low and the weak reading at the same time. In order to
generate the readings in (24) and (28) (and our (26b)), van Rooij adopts a mechanism
originally developed to deal with asymmetric readings in indicative donkey sentences
(Root 1986): Instead of relying on unselective quantification, the entire machinery
in (19-21) is relativized to a contextually given variable X that contains the variables
to be taken into account for the computation.
(29) h ↑X= k ↑X iff ∀x ∈ X : h(x) = k(x)
(30) 〈v,h〉 ≤∗,X〈w,g〉 〈u,k〉 iff h,k ⊇ g, h ↑X= k ↑X and v≤w u
(31) f ∗,X〈w,g〉(/φ/g) = {〈v,h〉 ∈ /φ/g : ¬∃〈u,k〉 ∈ /φ/g : 〈u,k〉<∗,X〈w,g〉 〈v,h〉}
(32) 〈v,h〉 ∼X 〈u,k〉 iff v = u and h ↑X= k ↑X
(33) Jφ >X ψK≤(〈w,g〉) = 1 iff ∀〈v,h〉 ∈ f ∗,X〈w,g〉(/φ/g) :
∃〈u,k〉 ∈ f ∗,X〈w,g〉(/φ/g) : 〈u,k〉 ∼X 〈v,h〉∧ 〈u,k〉 ∈ /ψ/g)
(29-30) tell us that a pair 〈v,h〉 is closer than 〈u,k〉 to the actual 〈w,g〉 if and
only if h and k are supersets of g, h and k coincide in the values assigned to the
unselectively bound variables in X , and v is closer to w than u. Out of the set of
pairs that make the antecedent true, f ∗,X〈w,g〉 selects the ones that are closest to 〈w,g〉,
as defined in (31). The sentence asserts that each such closest pair 〈v,h〉 is such that
there is a variant of it 〈u,k〉— with k matching h in the values of all the variables in
X and where v = u, as defined in (32) — making the consequent true.
The apparatus in (29-33) reduces to the previously defined version in (20-21) if X




w0 {d1,d2,d3} /0 /0
w1 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d1〉} {〈 j,d1〉}
w2 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d2〉} /0
w3 {d1,d2,d3} {〈 j,d3〉} /0
Table 2 A sample model for (34), with worlds ranked as follows: w0 < w1 <
w2 = w3
usual high donkey reading. If X lacks one of the variables, we obtain a low reading
for the corresponding indefinite and a weak reading for its anaphoric pronoun3.
We demonstrate this, first for the low reading from (26b) and then for the weak
reading from (28).
(34) If John owned a donkeyx, he would beat itx.
In the model in Table 2, the high reading with X = {x} comes out as false,
because John does not beat a donkey in either w2 or w3. For the low reading with
X = /0, however, we get a different result: Since, according to (30), two world-
assignment pairs are now comparable if their assignments are identical with respect
to the variables in X (which in this case reduces to a trivial requirement), we can
simply rank all candidate world-assignment pairs on the basis of their worlds. Since
w1 is more similar to the actual world than w2 and w3, the output of the selection
function defined in (31) returns the following:
(35) f ∗, /0〈w,g〉(/John owned a donkey/g) = {〈w1,gx/d1〉}
Since, in this world-assignment pair, the consequent also holds, the counterfac-
tual comes out as true under the low reading.
For the weak reading of (36), assume the model in Table 3:
(36) If I had a dime, I would throw it into the meter.
The selection function returns the following:
(37) f ∗, /0〈w,g〉(/I have a dime/g) = {〈w1,gx/d1〉,〈w1,gx/d2〉,〈w1,gx/d3〉}
3 Note that in van Rooij’s system, low and weak readings always go together, a feature we will inherit
from him. Howetver, it is an open question whether this is empirically the case: It might well be the
case that low+strong readings exist. This issue does not arise for the high reading, as here a weak and




w0 {d1,d2,d3} /0 /0
w1 {d1,d2,d3} {〈i,d1〉,〈i,d2〉,〈i,d3〉} {〈i,d1〉}
Table 3 A sample model for (36), with worlds ranked as follows: w0 < w1
Not all of these world-assignment pairs make the consequent true. In fact, only
〈w1,gx/d1〉 does. However, (33) only requires that for each world-assignment pair
there exists an X-equivalent world-assignment pair, as defined in (32), satisfying
the consequent. This is the case here: All three world-assignment pairs in (37)
are X-equivalent to 〈w1,gx/d1〉, which in turn satisfies the consequent, making the
counterfactual true.
2.2 Wang (2009)
Wang (2009) criticizes the second step by van Rooij (2006), as she sees no principled
way of specifying which donkey sentences are high/strong and which ones are
low/identifying/weak. While Wang does not explicitly argue for the unavailability of
high/strong readings on an empirical basis, she argues that we should give up on the
equivalence in (16). In the interest of a more unified analysis, Wang (2009) proposes
to treat low donkeys as the standard case instead, i.e., to make the similarity function
permanently insensitive to assignments. This essentially amounts to permanently
setting X = /0 in van Rooij’s system.
But, if low readings are the only genuine readings generated by the system, how
do we derive van Rooij’s (and our) intuition that, at least for some counterfactual
donkey sentences, the equivalence in (16) seems to hold? If high indefinite inter-
pretations are to be derived in Wang’s system4, they would arise as a sub-case of
the general low reading just in case the worlds and assignments are set up in the
model in a particular way: For any possible values d and d′ of the variable, the
most likely world that makes the antecedent true for d and the most likely world
that makes the antecedent true for d′ are equally ranked. This amounts to a rather
strong assumption about the model: All individuals are equally likely to fulfill the
antecedent, with no difference in similarity for the worlds in which they do so. In
the case of our classical donkey sentence in (3), this would require us to assume that
all combinations of farmer-donkey ownings are equally likely to obtain. We will
4 Wang (2009) does not, in fact, return to the question of high readings. We reconstruct them here in
order to show how the system compares to van Rooij’s (2006) account. In the interest of comparison,
we also neglect the fact that Wang additionally moves the analysis to an update semantics (Veltman
2005), as this seems to have no effect on the pertinent questions here.
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come back to this shortly in Section 3.1.
3 Criticism
We advance three points of criticism on the state-of-the-art we just described. The
first one concerns the status of the high indefinite interpretation: Is it a genuine
reading, as in van Rooij’s (2006) approach, or is it a sub-case of the low reading
arising only in certain contexts, as expected in Wang’s (2009) analysis? We will
show that Wang’s system makes wrong predictions and thus conclude that the
additional resources in van Rooij’s system are needed. Then we turn to van Rooij’s
proposal. As our second criticism, we will show that van Rooij’s system, as it
stands, overgenerates weak readings for identificational donkey sentences. Our third
criticism is that van Rooij’s approach underlicenses NPIs in low readings.
3.1 Differing predictions: Wang vs. van Rooij
As just discussed in Section 2.2, Wang (2009) makes the prediction that high donkey
interpretations should only be available in very particular circumstances. Obviously,
we are not always willing to assume such circumstances. Specifically, consider the
following scenario, where not all the individuals quantified over – the farmers in
King Kakos’s kingdom – are equally likely to own a donkey.5:
(38) Scenario: There are two farmers in the kingdom of King Kakos, called
Onophilos and Onophobos. Both are very poor and do not own a donkey.
Onophobos is a cruel man who would love to own and beat a donkey. He
has been saving money all his life and has nearly enough to buy a donkey.
Onophilos is a mild-mannered vegan who has no means or interest in owning
a donkey, much less so in beating it. King Kakos only knows Onophobos and
is convinced that all inhabitants of his kingdom are just as cruel and evil as
Onophobus. He discusses this with his advisor, who is well-informed about
all the farmers and their dispositions.
(39) a. KING KAKOS: Here’s what I think about the farmers in my kingdom. If a
farmer in my kingdom owned a donkey, he would beat it.
b. ADVISOR: You are wrong. It’s not the case that if a farmer in your
kingdom owned a donkey, he would beat it. Onophilos is a vegan and
would never do so.
In the scenario in (38), we judge (39b) to be true. However, this is not what
Wang (2009) predicts. Clearly, a world in which Onophobos owns a donkey is more
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer from Sinn und Bedeutung 20 for pointing out the correct names for
the farmers in our example, and Vasiliki Erotokritou for additional help with Ancient Greek.
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similar to the actual world than one in which Onophilos owns a donkey. But then,
according to Wang, we should only consider the world-assignment pair in which
Onophobos is the donkey-owning farmer in order to evaluate the counterfactual.
Since in that world-assignment pair the donkey is beaten, King Kakos’s statement
is predicted to be true and, thus, his advisor’s statement is predicted to be false,
contrary to fact.
We conclude that Wang’s proposal lacks a way of producing the truth conditions
we observe in (38-39).
3.2 Overgeneration: Identificational donkey sentences
van Rooij (2006) aims to account for identificational sentences like (24), repeated
below as (40), as a subclass of ‘standard’ counterfactual donkeys, with an animal as
a low indefinite and it as a donkey pronoun:
(40) If an{a(lex),b,c} animal had escaped last night, it would have been Alex.
We note that applying van Rooij’s analysis as it stands to identificational sen-
tences overgenerates weak readings. To derive the intended reading of (40), van
Rooij needs two ingredients: (i) the interpretation template (33), which yields the
truth conditions spelled out in (41a) and paraphrased in (41b), and (ii) a uniqueness
assumption in the context that guarantees that, in each of the worlds under consid-
eration, exactly one animal escaped (van Rooij 2006:395). The latter assumption
has the effect of making the truth-conditional output "one of the escaped animals"
contextually equivalent to the perceived interpretation "the (unique) escaped animal".
(41) a. JIf an animal had escaped, it would have been AlexK≤(〈w,g〉) = 1 iff
∀〈v,h〉 ∈ f ∗,X〈w,g〉(/an animal has escaped/g) : ∃〈u,k〉 ∈ f ∗,X〈w,g〉(/an
animal has escaped/g) : 〈u,k〉 ∼X 〈v,h〉∧ 〈u,k〉 ∈ /it was Alex/g)
b. "If an animal out of {a, b, c} had escaped last night, one of the escaped
animals would have been Alex."
However, while one might argue that this uniqueness assumption is reasonably
invoked in many contexts, it will not always be so. Consider the scenario in (42).
Here, we create a context that explicitly removes the uniqueness assumption by
making the closest worlds where animal-escaping occurs be worlds where both Alex
the Lion and Tara the Lioness escape. Van Rooij’s system predicts that in those
cases we should obtain the plain weak reading (41) as ‘one of the lions would have
been Alex’, which would render sentence (42b) (felicitous and) true in that scenario.
However, this reading is unavailable and the sentence is not judged true.
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(42) a. Scenario: The gate of the lions was left open. Alex the Lion and Tara the
Lioness are the most curious among the lions, always tampering with the
gates. They are inseparable and always go together.
b. # If an{alex,b,c,tara} animal had escaped, it would have been Alex the Lion.
While we agree with van Rooij that the NP an animal in (40) should be treated
as a low indefinite, we will argue in Section 4.1 that a different treatment of the
pronoun is needed in identificational sentences.
3.3 Undergeneration: NPI licensing
One of van Rooij’s (2006) main goals is to derive the licensing of NPIs in the
antecedent of counterfactual donkey sentences, underlined in (43):
(43) If John owned any donkey, he would beat it.
Van Rooij aims to do so by "dynamicizing" the traditional Stalnaker-Lewis
variably strict analysis of counterfactuals, with the result presented in Section 2.1.
He derives the NPI licensing on the basis of Kadmon & Landman’s (1993) widening
analysis. The assumption here is that any widens the domain of quantification,
and that such a widening is licensed whenever the resulting proposition is logically
stronger than that expressed by the same utterance without the domain widening. Van
Rooij points out that under his analysis, adding more individuals to the domain has
the counterfactual quantifying over more world-assignment pairs (but still including
the world-assignment pairs the selection function yields from the original domain).
Thus, NPIs are predicted to be licensed by a combination of his analysis with
Kadmon & Landman 1993.
However, we note that this only holds as long as we assume the high reading of
the counterfactual donkey sentence. Under the high reading, we saw that (17) with a
wide domain amounts to the conjunction of (18a), (18b) and (18c). Correspondingly,
(44) with a narrower domain amounts to the conjunction of just (18a) and (18b).
Since the first conjunction entails the second, NPIs are correctly predicted to be
licensed.
(44) If John owned a{d1,d2} donkey, he would beat it.
But, under a low reading of the indefinite, the situation changes: Depending on
the similarity ranking of the world in which members of the widened domain satisfy
the antecedent, we might end up with an entirely new set of world-assignment pairs,
or possibly with exactly the same set as before. For example, if John is likely to
inherit Melissa, whereas acquiring other donkeys in the non-widened domain D is
less likely, adding more donkeys to the domain of quantification can result in (i)
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adding donkeys that are more likely to be acquired than Melissa, (ii) adding donkeys
that are less likely to be acquired than Melissa and (iii) adding donkeys that are
exactly as likely to be acquired as Melissa. Under a weak reading, (i) will yield
quantification over a set of world-assignment pairs that does not include the original
world-assignment pair in which John owns Melissa; (ii) will yield quantification
over exactly the same world-assignment pair in which John owns Melissa but no
other world-assignment pairs; and only in case of (iii) the counterfactual will yield a
logically stronger statement. Thus, van Rooij (2006) would predict that we should
not be able to license NPIs in low donkeys, except for the specific circumstances of
(iii). However, this is not what we observe: NPIs are in fact licensed, as (45) and
(46) show.
(45) If I had any dime, I would throw it into the meter.
(46) If any{a(lex),b,c} animal had escaped last night, it would have been Alex.
4 Proposal
In view of the limitations of Wang’s account noted above, we adopt van Rooij’s
analysis in (29)-(33) and take it as our point of departure. Two refinements will
be built on this system. First, it will be argued that the pronoun in identificational
sentences is not a donkey pronoun but a concealed question or part of a cleft
(subsection 4.1). This minor modification, which we will motivate on morphological
data, will derive a mandatory uniqueness effect in identificational sentences. Second,
in order to have a general account of NPI licensing in counterfactual antecedents, we
will abandon the Stalnaker-Lewis variably strict conditional analysis and assume the
strict conditional approach to counterfactuals with a modal horizon defended in von
Fintel (2001) (subsection 4.2). Van Rooij’s apparatus for donkey quantification will
then be recast in the strict conditional analysis (section 4.3). This more substantial
change will allow us to license NPIs both for high and for low donkey indefinites.
4.1 The pronoun in identificational sentences
We saw that analyzing (40), repeated below as (47), à la van Rooij 2006 – i.e.,
treating the indefinite an animal as a low indefinite and the pronoun it as a donkey
pronoun – incorrectly generates a weak reading. While we agree with van Rooij that
the indefinite in (47) receives a low reading, we argue that the pronoun should not be
analyzed as a donkey pronoun. Donkey pronouns mandatorily agree in gender with
their antecedent, as illustrated in (48). In contrast, in the identificational sentences at
issue, the pronoun does not agree with the intended antecedent, a fact that becomes
apparent as soon as masculine or feminine antecedents are used; witness (49).
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(47) If an{a(lex),b,c} animal had escaped last night, it would have been Alex.
(48) If a man owned Platero, he / # it would beat the poor animal.
(49) a. If Alex were married to a girl from his class, it would be Sue.
b. # If Alex were married to a girl from his class, she would be Sue.
We propose that the "identificational" pronoun is either the invariable it-form of
a cleft-construction6 or a pronoun referring to a concealed question (of type 〈s,e〉).
This explains its invariably neutral form: In cleft-constructions it is a fossilized
form, and concealed question NPs are mandatorily pronominalized in neuter form,
as shown in (50) (Romero 2004; see also Mikkelsen 2005).
(50) John guessed the winner of the Oscar for best actress before I guessed it /
#her.
More importantly, the proposed treatment of the pronoun rules out weak readings
and secures the desired uniqueness effect. Cleft-constructions have been argued to
presuppose exhaustivity (Büring 2011, Velleman, Beaver, Destruel, Bumford, Onea
& Coppock 2013). This means that the second sentence in (51) cannot be understood
as "Sam was one of those who came" and, as a result, the sequence is infelicitous.
Similarly, the interrogative in (52) cannot be understood as "Do you know one of the
two prices?", which, again, makes the sequence odd.
(51) Two students came. # It was Sam who came.
(52) John knows neither the price of milk nor the price of oil. # Do you know it?
Thus, we propose that the static version of the truth conditions for the consequent
clause of (47) is as follows: Either the cleft semantics in (53), where ALT is the set of
alternative propositions generated by focus (Velleman et al. 2013), or the concealed
question semantics in (54) (Romero 2005).7
(53) λw : ∀q ∈ ALT[q⊂ [λw′.escape(a,w′)]→¬q(w)].
∃q ∈ ALT[q(w)∧ q⊆ [λw′.escape(a,w′)]]
(54) λw.[λw′.ιx[animal(x,w′)∧ escape(x,w′)]](w) = a
6 See Büring (1998) for a similar claim concerning anaphora in modal subordination environments.
7 We leave open whether it corresponds to a cleft or to a concealed question in these examples. In
principle, both strategies seem available in the grammar, since, with a plural antecedent, the singular
pronoun it is possible – suggesting that it is part of a cleft – and the plural form they is acceptable as
well – which suggests that the pronoun functions as a concealed question.
(1) Nobody solved the problem. But if two students had solved the problem, it / they would have
been Pat and Marisa.
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4.2 A strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals and NPI licensing
In plain (non-donkey) counterfactual sentences, the antecedent clause seems, prima
facie, not to be a downward entailing context: (55a) does not entail (55b) with a
strengthened antecedent. Nevertheless, NPIs are licensed here; witness (56).
(55) a. If I strike this match, it will light.
b.; If this match gets wet and I strike it, it will light.
(56) If I strike any match, Mary will be upset.
To solve this puzzle, von Fintel (1999) make two moves. The first one is to
refine the notion of downward entailment needed: NPIs are licensed in Strawson-
downward entailing contexts, as defined in (57). This modification is independently
motivated for NPIs under only and other constructions. The second change concerns
conditionals: Instead of the traditional variably strict semantic approach, von Fintel
advocates for a strict conditional analysis that will make counterfactual antecedents
Strawson-downward entailing.
(57) A function f of type 〈σ ,τ〉 is Strawson-downward-entailing iff for all x and
y of type σ such that x⇒ y and f (x) is defined: f (y)⇒ f (x).
Let us see the second change in a bit more detail. In the traditional variably
strict semantic approach, the accessibility function f and the antecedent φ bundle
together to form the restriction of the quantification over possible worlds. This makes
conditional antecedents not (Strawson-)downward entailing (see e.g., von Fintel
1999: 136-138). In the strict conditional analysis envisioned in von Fintel 1999 and
further developed in von Fintel 2001 and Gillies 2007, the device securing maximal
similarity and the antecedent φ are separated. More concretely, conditionals are
evaluated relative to a domain of quantification D – the so-called ‘Modal Horizon’ –
that begins as a set of worlds very similar to the actual world and evolves through
discourse. The definedness and truth conditions of a counterfactual sentence φ > ψ
are given in (58). Whenever φ and the original domain D do not overlap – as it
typically happens with counterfactuals – D is shifted to an expanded domain D′ along
the lines of (59), so that the presupposition in (58a) is satisfied. Then, restricted to
the new domain D′, the sentence asserts that all φ -worlds are also ψ-worlds.
(58) a. Presupposition:Jφ > ψKD is defined only if JφK∩D 6= /0
b. Assertion:Jφ > ψKD(w) = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ D : w′ ∈ JφK→ w′ ∈ JψK
(59) Modal Horizon expansion:
D′ = D ∪ {w| ∀w′ ∈ JφK : w≤ w′}
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The semantics in (58) makes counterfactual antecedents Strawson-downward
entailing. For any sentences φ , ψ and χ , it holds that, for any modal domain D
for which both Jφ > ψKD and J(φ ∧ χ) > ψKD are defined, the former will entail
the latter; see (60a-b). Hence, NPIs are correctly predicted to be licensed in the
antecedents of conditionals. As for the inference in (55), the semantics above
renders it valid. Its apparent invalidity stems from the fact that, in evaluating the
first conditional, the reader picks a minimally extended domain D’ (with the match
struck and still dry) and, in judging the second, she uses a further extended D" (with
the match struck and wet).
(60) a. ∀w′ ∈ D : w′ ∈ JφK→ w′ ∈ JψK
b. ∀w′ ∈ D : w′ ∈ Jφ ∧χK→ w′ ∈ JψK
4.3 Dynamic quantification in a strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals
The strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals described in 4.2 allows us to
account for the NPI licensing that was problematic in the variably strict account
of van Rooij (2006). Now we are faced with a similar task to that of van Rooij:
to combine these semantics with a dynamic semantics for the quantificational phe-
nomena in donkey sentences. In order to adapt the strict conditional analysis of
counterfactuals to a dynamic semantics for quantification, we need to reconsider the
shape of the modal horizon, similar to the reconstruction of an appropriate similarity
function in (30). Since von Fintel (2001) is not dealing with assignment functions,
his modal horizon is simply a set of worlds. In order to be compatible with DPL,
the modal horizon needs to take the shape of a set of world-assignment pairs. For
the definition of auxiliary notions in (61-63), we follow van Rooij (2006). Our
innovation is (64-65):
(61) h ↑X= k ↑X iff ∀x ∈ X : h(x) = k(x)
(62) 〈v,h〉 ≤∗,X〈w,g〉 〈u,k〉 iff h,k ⊇ g,h ↑X= k ↑X ,and v≤w u
(63) 〈v,h〉 ∼X 〈u,k〉 iff v = u and h ↑X= k ↑X
(64) Modal Horizon expansion:
f ∗|φ >X ψ| f ∗,≤∗g = λ 〈w,g〉. f ∗(〈w,g〉)∪
{〈v,h〉 ∈ JφK f ∗,≤∗g : ¬∃〈u,k〉 ∈ JφK f ∗,≤∗g : 〈u,k〉<∗,X〈w,g〉 〈v,h〉}
(65) Truth conditions:Jφ >X ψK f ∗,≤∗g = {〈w,g〉 : ∀〈v,h〉 ∈ f ∗|φ >X ψ| f ∗,≤∗g (〈w,g〉) :
if 〈v,h〉 ∈ JφK f ∗,≤∗g then ∃〈u,k〉 ∈ JφK f ∗,≤∗g : 〈u,k〉∼X 〈v,h〉∧〈u,k〉 ∈ JψK f ∗,≤∗g }
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farmer donkey own beat
w0 {a,b} {d} /0 /0
w1 {a,b} {d} {〈a,d〉} {〈a,d〉}
w2 {a,b} {d} {〈b,d〉} /0
Table 4 A sample model for (66), with w0 < w1 < w2
The update of the modal horizon proceeds as usual. As spelled out in (64), the
original modal horizon for the world-assignment pair 〈w,g〉 is extended to be the
union of the original modal horizon plus the set of all the world-assignment pairs
〈v,h〉 satisfying the antecedent for which there is no other world-assignment pair
〈u,k〉 satisfying the antecedent which is more similar to 〈w,g〉.
The truth conditions in (65) tells us that the counterfactual denotes the set of
world-assignment pairs 〈w,g〉 that have the following property: All world-assignment
pairs in the updated modal horizon of 〈w,g〉 are such that if they satisfy the an-
tecedent, there is at least one X-comparable – in the sense of (63) – world-assignment
pair in the modal horizon that also satisfies the consequent.
Since this semantics for the counterfactual is Strawson-downward entailing
(von Fintel 2001), we obtain the NPI licensing for both high and low readings of
counterfactual donkey sentences.
4.4 Generating the high reading
For simplicity, assume an initial modal horizon f ∗(〈w,g〉) = /0 for any 〈w,g〉. In the
actual world w0, no farmer owns a donkey. In w1, Onophobos owns a donkey and
beats it. In w2, Onophilos owns a donkey but doesn’t beat it. This is schematized
in Table 4. Under these circumstances, we want to judge (66) as true under a high
reading where X = {x,y}.
(66) It is not the case that if ax farmer owned ay donkey, hex would beat ity.
Then evaluating the counterfactual in (66) requires an update of the modal
horizon to include at least some worlds in which a farmer owns a donkey. Using the
definition in (64), we obtain the following updated modal horizon:
(67) f ∗|a farmer owns a donkey >{x,y} he beats it| f ∗,≤∗g =
{〈w1,gx\a,y\d〉,〈w2,gx\b,y\d〉}
Quantifying over these worlds, we find that the consequent of (66) is true in w1,
but not in w2, rendering the (negated) counterfactual true as intended.
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4.5 Generating the low + weak reading
Now we are aiming for a low plus weak reading of the non-negated version of (66),
provided in (68). This means that we make X = /0. The model is as above, which
makes sentence (68) true.
(68) If ax farmer owned ay donkey, hex would beat ity.
We then yield the following modal horizon:
(69) f ∗|a farmer owns a donkey > /0 he beats it| f ∗,≤∗g = {〈w1,gx\a,y\d〉}
That is, since our similarity function as defined in (30) now ignores the assign-
ments, we end up with a total ordering of the worlds that make the antecedent of
(66) true. In this case, w1 is the bottom element and we only quantify over (69),
rendering the counterfactual sentence (68) true, as intended.
5 Conclusions
Contra Wang 2009, our proposal maintains the key insights and chief apparatus
from van Rooij 2006 and derives high as well as low readings of indefinite NPs.
However, by treating the (relevant) pronoun in identificational sentences not as a
donkey pronoun but as a concealed question or part of a cleft, we avoid the problem
of overgeneration of weak readings that van Rooij faces. Finally, by moving from
a variably strict semantics for the counterfactual to a modal horizon-based strict
semantics à la von Fintel 2001, we can account for NPI licensing both in high and
low readings of counterfactual donkey sentences, thus improving on the empirical
coverage of van Rooij’s original system.
Some open questions remain: We would like to know more about which con-
textual cues determine the content of X , e.g., focus (Heim 1990). In addition, our
proposal still keeps the quantificational dynamics quite separate from the coun-
terfactual dynamics, and the consequences of this theoretical choice remain to be
explored. As Asher & McCready (2007) point out, there is some interaction between
the phenomena described in this paper and the puzzle of modal subordination. We
will be exploring some of these interactions in further research.
References
Asher, Nicholas & Eric McCready. 2007. Were, would, might and a compositional
account of counterfactuals. Journal of Semantics 24(2). 93–129.
Büring, Daniel. 1998. Identity, modality, and the candidate behind the wall. In Devon
Strolovich & Aaron Lawson (eds.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic
Theory (SALT) 8, 36–54. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.
305
Walker & Romero
Büring, Daniel. 2004. Crossover situations. Natural Language Semantics 12(1).
23–62.
Büring, Daniel. 2011. Conditional exhaustivity presuppositions in clefts (and defi-
nites). Ms. ZAS/Vienna .
Elbourne, Paul. 2005. Situations and Individuals. MIT Press.
von Fintel, Kai. 1999. NPI licensing, Strawson entailment, and context dependency.
Journal of semantics 16(2). 97–148.
von Fintel, Kai. 2001. Counterfactuals in a dynamic context. Current Studies in
Linguistics Series 36. 123–152.
Geach, P. T. 1962. Reference and Generality. Cornell University Press.
Gillies, Anthony S. 2007. Counterfactual scorekeeping. Linguistics and Philosophy
30(3). 329–360.
Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin Stokhof. 1991. Dynamic predicate logic. Linguistics
and Philosophy 14(1). 39–100.
Heim, Irene. 1990. E-type pronouns and donkey anaphora. Linguistics and Philoso-
phy 13(2). 137–177.
Kadmon, Nirit & Fred Landman. 1993. Any. Linguistics and philosophy 16(4).
353–422.
Lewis, David K. 1973. Counterfactuals. Blackwell.
Mikkelsen, Line. 2005. Copular Clauses. Specification, Predication and Equation.
John Benjamins.
Romero, Maribel. 2004. Intensional noun phrases with know and be. Catalan
Journal of Linguistics 3(1). 147–178.
Romero, Maribel. 2005. Concealed questions and specificational subjects. Linguis-
tics and Philosophy 28(6). 687–737.
van Rooij, Robert. 2006. Free choice counterfactual donkeys. Journal of Semantics
23(4). 383–402.
Root, Rebecca Louise. 1986. The semantics of anaphora in discourse. University of
Texas Press.
Schubert, Lenhart K & Francis Jeffry Pelletier. 1987. Problems in the representation
of the logical form of generics, plurals, and mass nouns. In Ernest Lepore (ed.),
New directions in semantics, 385–451. Academic Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1968. A theory of conditionals. Americal Philosophical
Quarterly Monograph Series, 2. 98–112.
Velleman, Dan, David Beaver, Emilie Destruel, Dylan Bumford, Edgar Onea & Liz
Coppock. 2013. It-clefts are IT (inquiry terminating) constructions. In Anca
Chereches (ed.), Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 22, 441–460.
Wang, Y. 2009. Counterfactual donkey sentences: A response to Robert van Rooij.
Journal of Semantics 26(3). 317–328.
306
Counterfactual donkey sentences
Andreas Walker
University of Konstanz
andreas.walker@uni-konstanz.de
Maribel Romero
University of Konstanz
maribel.romero@uni-konstanz.de
307
